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Working with Bertha Wilson: 
Perspectives on Liberty, 
Judicial Decision-Making 
and a Judge’s Role 
Robert Yalden* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
My first conversation with Bertha Wilson took place in the spring of 
1989. The Supreme Court of Canada had just received authorization to 
increase its complement of law clerks from two to three per judge in 
order to assist it in dealing with a workload that had grown substantially 
since the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.1 As 
candidates normally applied a year and a half before the start date, the 
justices were particularly anxious to secure a third clerk each for the 
rapidly approaching autumn 1989 session.  
I remember very little about that first conversation: it was brief and 
not particularly substantive. But one thing has always stuck in my mind: 
my surprise at hearing a strong Scottish accent at the other end of the 
line. This was a revelation! I had studied Bertha Wilson’s jurisprudence 
with enormous interest, seen photos of her and read articles praising and 
criticizing her. But I had never heard her give a speech or an interview. 
Bertha Wilson’s judicial accomplishments were significant and she will 
also rightly be remembered as the first woman appointed to the Supreme 
Court of Canada. But my first conversation with her drove home in a 
very real way another dimension of her legacy that it is easy to forget: 
hers was also a remarkable story of a Scottish immigrant’s extraordinary 
success in a new country.  
                                                                                                             
* Partner, Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP. I wish to thank Leslie-Anne Wood for her 
assistance with the preparation of this article. 
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
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Bertha was quick to get to the point. Would I be ready to start that 
September? She need hardly have asked. And so began an extraordinary 
journey: from law student reading and analyzing her pronouncements, to 
law clerk working with her to craft judgments as she wrestled with some 
of the most challenging questions to come before the Court during what 
was, as it turned out, her last full year on the bench.  
I mention this last point because she was by this stage one of the 
most senior judges on the Supreme Court of Canada, having joined the 
Court in 1982 as the Charter was first being tested. My good fortune, 
then, was to work with Bertha Wilson when she was at the peak of her 
judicial career — fully engaged, intellectually alert, remarkably 
disciplined and extremely hard working. More than this though, she was 
by this time very well versed in the ways of our highest Court. As a 
result, she had a finely developed understanding of how to make the 
most of the resources at her disposal in order to shape aspects of debates 
before and within the Court that she felt required careful consideration. 
To this I should add that it was also a time when the Court was still 
putting in place foundational concepts and methodologies for Charter 
analysis. This presented unique challenges and required a heightened 
understanding of the Court’s role in a democratic structure that had just 
undergone profound transformation. Indeed, one of the enduring lessons 
of my experience working with Justice Wilson was the extent to which 
the legitimacy of the Supreme Court of Canada rests on the shoulders of 
the individuals appointed to that Court and on their understanding of the 
Court’s role in our parliamentary democracy.  
Justice Wilson was of course a judge who provoked strong reactions 
in many quarters. This is no surprise: her reasoning was frequently 
forceful and she was a deeply principled person. All too often, however, 
commentators have allowed their disagreement over the outcome of a 
given case to colour their assessment of her understanding of the judge’s 
role in our constitutional framework, suggesting that she was a “judicial 
activist”. This is unfortunate. For surely the measure of whether a judge 
has properly grasped his or her constitutional role is not a function of 
whether one agrees or disagrees with a particular judgment in a 
particular case — or even in a series of cases. The issue that one must 
properly begin with is what approach a judge uses to reach a given 
conclusion and whether that approach reflects a full appreciation of the 
role and responsibilities that we expect judges to discharge. 
My concern in this article is not to resolve, once and for all, whether 
Bertha Wilson was or was not a “judicial activist”. While the article will 
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offer some observations with respect to this question, many will no 
doubt continue to debate the matter for years to come. In any event, it is 
not entirely obvious that the term “judicial activist” has anything 
approaching a widely accepted meaning. It is something of a 
normatively loaded term that is more likely to cloud issues than to assist 
in clarifying the contours of a particular judge’s understanding of their 
constitutional role. My goal is instead a more modest one: to provide the 
reader with some perspective on how, in practice, Bertha Wilson 
approached judicial decision-making and what this tells one about her 
understanding of a judge’s role. That will not resolve broader debates 
about whether her views on these matters were sound. But in my view it 
is an exercise that sheds valuable light on her understanding of the limits 
of the judge’s role and that offers the prospect of a more textured 
discussion about what it is appropriate for a judge to consider and to do 
when engaged in judicial decision-making. 
Over the course of my year with Justice Wilson, I worked on a large 
number of cases that touched many different areas of law. These 
included cases involving criminal law, evidence, administrative law, the 
division of powers, language rights, family law, the law of torts, banking 
law, insurance, civil law — and the list goes on. Especially challenging 
and rewarding were a number of cases involving Aboriginal rights under 
different treaties and the first case in which the Supreme Court set out its 
approach to Aboriginal rights under section 35 of the Charter.2 These 
allowed me to work closely with Justice Wilson on an area that we both 
cared about deeply and that would feed directly into her subsequent 
work as a member of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. The 
Aboriginal rights cases also gave me particular insight into her strong 
sense of compassion and her view that courts in Canada had an 
important role to play in ensuring that rights that had all too often been 
completely ignored were given full recognition.3  
For purposes of this article, however, I have selected a handful of 
significant Charter decisions concerning freedom of expression that 
seem to me to provide particular insight into her way of approaching 
                                                                                                             
2 These included R. v. Sioui, [1990] S.C.J. No. 48, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Horseman, [1990] S.C.J. No. 39, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901 (S.C.C.); Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, 
[1990] S.C.J. No. 63, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85 (S.C.C.) and the first case in which the Supreme Court of 
Canada set out its approach to Aboriginal rights under the Charter: R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. No. 
49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sparrow”]. 
3 For a discussion of my work with Justice Wilson on these cases, see: Ellen Anderson, 
Judging Bertha Wilson: Law as Large as Life (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), at 193-
96.  
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hard cases and her view of a judge’s role under our Constitution. What I 
hope to convey is that her very way of working through these cases tells 
one something about her understanding of the business of judging and 
about the limits of the Court’s role in the development of the law. These 
are not points that she set out in a list of “dos and don’ts” — they are 
observations concerning both the strategies that she used to tackle 
difficult cases and what she saw as the boundaries within which she had 
to operate. 
II. SETTING THE SCENE: PERSPECTIVES ON WILSON’S 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE JUDICIAL ROLE 
As noted above, some have argued that Justice Wilson was a 
“judicial activist”. For example, in a piece published in 1995 Robert 
Hawkins and Robert Martin argue that Justice Wilson failed to respect 
the limits which should constrain judicial review in a democratic society. 
They suggest that she had an expansive view of the role of the courts 
under the Charter that was at odds with the intentions that were those of 
the Charter’s framers and that appropriated a quasi-legislative role for 
the judiciary. They claim that Justice Wilson developed strategies for 
Charter analysis that were divorced from principle and based on a 
subjective theory of interpretation. In their view, Justice Wilson used 
“judicial review as a vehicle for promoting her personal, ideological 
agenda. In so doing, she became the most political Supreme Court judge 
in Canadian history. She did not simply transgress the boundaries that 
restrain the behaviour of judges in a liberal democracy, she denied their 
existence”.4 
Others have suggested that if she was at times seen as a “heretic”, it 
was because her judicial philosophy was anchored in a conception of 
liberty that led her to approach Charter interpretation from a perspective 
that was on occasion at odds with that of her colleagues.5 Justice 
McPherson argues that “[i]t is clear from the cases that Justice Wilson 
regards liberty as one of the most important values in a democratic 
society”.6 He goes on to argue that he believes “that Justice Wilson’s 
                                                                                                             
4 R.E. Hawkins & R. Martin, “Democracy, Judging and Bertha Wilson” (1995) 41 McGill 
L.J. 1, at 13. 
5 James MacPherson, “Canadian Constitutional Law and Madame Justice Bertha Wilson 
— Patriot, Visionary and Heretic” (1992) 15 Dalhousie L.J. 217, at 237 [hereinafter “‘Canadian 
Constitutional Law and Justice Wilson’”]. 
6 Id., at 237. 
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distinctive or heretical positions can be explained by the belief, shared 
with several of her colleagues but held by her in a more absolute fashion, 
that the Charter really was intended to impose new and important 
constraints on government”.7  
There is no doubt that Justice Wilson was steeped in a particular 
conception of liberty that traces its roots to John Stuart Mill and that this 
had an impact on her thinking about the Charter. Indeed, she often 
referred to Mill in her reasons. For example, in her 1986 decision R. v. 
Jones she wrote:  
I believe that the framers of the Constitution in guaranteeing “liberty” 
as a fundamental value in a free and democratic society had in mind 
the freedom of the individual to develop and realize his potential to the 
full, to plan his own life to suit his character, to make his own choices 
for good or for ill, to be non-conformist, idiosyncratic and even 
eccentric — to be in today’s parlance, his own person and accountable 
as such. John Stuart Mill described it as pursuing our own good in our 
own way.8 
This perspective would wind its way through other judgments, 
including ones that were the focus of considerable attention and 
controversy.9  
One should not, however, assume that a distinctive approach is 
synonymous with an activist or heretical approach. Justice Wilson’s 
approach to many issues was rooted in a perspective on liberty that 
represents an essential strand in the way in which we think about Charter 
issues. It is difficult to view J.S. Mill as holding a perspective on liberty 
that we would today view as heretical or “opposed to official or 
established views or doctrines”.10 Indeed, in an article that I wrote two 
years prior to becoming a law clerk to Justice Wilson, I suggested that 
J.S. Mill’s view was instead part of a deeply rooted and rather classical 
tradition. I then examined the way in which the Court’s earliest Charter 
jurisprudence was wrestling with this classical vision of liberty and a 
vision of liberty that was shaped by, but moved beyond, this 
perspective.11  
                                                                                                             
7 Id., at 239. 
8 [1986] S.C.J. No. 56, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, at 318 (S.C.C.). 
9 See, for example, her observations on liberty in R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, 
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 164-67 (S.C.C.). 
10 “Canadian Constitutional Law and Justice Wilson”, supra, note 5, at 237. 
11 R. Yalden, “Liberalism and Canadian Constitutional Law: Tensions in an Evolving 
Vision of Liberty” (1988) 47(1) U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 132. 
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The article did, however, go on to note that while some judges such 
as Justice Lamer were deeply wedded to a vision of liberty that was 
limited to the classical vision of rights as existing to protect a form of 
negative liberty — that is, freedom from state intrusion in a person’s life 
— other judges such as Justice Wilson and Chief Justice Dickson had 
showed openness to the proposition that “the public-private boundary is 
rather more artificial than those who speak the language of hard edged 
rights suggest”. I then noted that certain propositions found in Justice 
Wilson’s early Charter jurisprudence suggested that Canadian 
constitutional thought might well be “able to accommodate a vision of 
individuals’ relations with society that sees society as able to make a 
worthwhile contribution to an individual’s self-realization, and not 
simply as an enemy to be kept as far away as possible from private 
spheres”.12  
Little did I realize at the time I wrote this article that I would come 
to see in person just how hard Justice Wilson was wrestling with this 
evolving vision of liberty. For while she was acutely sensitive to the 
need to limit state intrusion in the private sphere, she was also aware that 
the public-private distinction had blurred as the role of the state had 
evolved and that, as a result, the state in our democracy was often called 
upon to establish background conditions essential to enabling individuals 
to realize their full potential. That said, I also had not realized prior to 
working with her that she felt strongly that her role on the Court 
constrained the extent to which she could move to embrace a vision of 
liberty that was rooted not solely in a conception of negative liberty, but 
that made space for the role of the state in fostering a more positive 
conception. As we will see, my thoughts as a young and rather idealistic 
law student about the potential for Charter jurisprudence to move toward 
a more expansive and textured vision of liberty would soon bump up 
against the complex reality of the institution of which Bertha Wilson was 
an essential part and, even more significantly, against Bertha Wilson’s 
own understanding of the ways in which being part of that institution 
meant that she should approach the business of judging.  
These constraints came into focus as I worked with her on a series of 
significant Charter decisions. First I was exposed to the care that she 
took to craft decisions that she felt gave rise to important methodological 
questions, a lesson I learned in spades working with her on Edmonton 
                                                                                                             
12 Id., at 154. 
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Journal.13 Then I saw how this care led her to tread carefully when she 
felt that she was approaching terrain that would take the Court beyond 
long-established conceptions of liberty, be it in the Prostitution Trilogy14 
or in cases such as Keegstra15 that dealt with hate speech. At the same 
time, I saw her concerned to ensure that the care shown not to get out 
ahead of our community’s most deeply held values not blind the Court to 
the reality that these values necessarily evolve over time and that the role 
of the state has also evolved, a point that emerged clearly in cases 
concerning mandatory retirement. Let me turn, then, to each of these 
episodes. 
III. WILSON’S DECISION-MAKING IN PRACTICE 
1. Freedom of Expression — Round 1: Edmonton Journal 
The first substantive case that I was called to work on with Justice 
Wilson was Edmonton Journal. The question at issue was whether 
section 30(1) of the Alberta Judicature Act16 (a provision enacted in 
1935) contravened the right to freedom of the press found in section 2(b) 
of the Charter. The provision prohibited the publication of any detail 
relating to matrimonial proceedings other than the names, addresses and 
occupations of the parties and witnesses; a concise statement of the 
charges, defences, counter-charges and legal submissions; and the 
summing-up of the judge, the findings of the jury and the judgment of 
the court. 
Oral arguments had been heard in March 1989 and I had not been 
involved in any previous discussion of the case in Justice Wilson’s 
chambers. Indeed, I had heard little about the case until I arrived at the 
Court in September of that year, only to have Justice Wilson hand me 
two sets of reasons: one that Justice Cory had circulated among the 
justices finding a breach of section 2(b) of the Charter that could not be 
                                                                                                             
13 Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 
1326 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Edmonton Journal”]. 
14 Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, 
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 (S.C.C.); R. v. Skinner, [1990] S.C.J. No. 51, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1235 (S.C.C.); 
R. v. Stagnitta, [1990] S.C.J. No. 50, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1226 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Prostitution 
Trilogy”]. 
15 R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Keegstra”]. 
16 R.S.A. 1980, c. J-1 [now R.S.A. 2000, c. J-2]. 
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justified under section 1 of the Charter; and another that Justice La 
Forest had circulated finding that while there was a breach of section 
2(b), this could be justified under section 1. My task was to write a 
memorandum examining the nature of the values that the judgments 
addressed. I was given very little indication of what might be on Justice 
Wilson’s mind, other than that she was not entirely certain that either 
judgment had adequately captured the way in which the values in issue 
came into play in this case. She had signalled that she saw merit in 
Justice Cory’s decision, but was not certain that she was comfortable 
with how he had arrived at his conclusion.  
Anxious not to disappoint, I set about reading, researching, 
analyzing and then writing a memo which I served up a little later that 
same month. The memo suggested that the first value at play was the 
need for open trials and that there were arguments over and above those 
that Justice Cory had set out that could be made in favour of this value 
(which he had linked principally to the desirability that the public know 
what is taking place in court), arguments that were related to the 
importance that the litigants themselves might place on a public trial. 
The memo also examined Justice La Forest’s analysis of the right to 
privacy, suggesting that privacy arguments were not sufficiently 
compelling in this instance to justify as broad a prohibition on publicity 
as the one found in section 30(1) of the Judicature Act and that it was 
not difficult to envisage a more carefully tailored provision that would 
prohibit publicity when certain kinds of allegations (e.g., sexual abuse of 
children) were involved. Finally, the memo took issue with Justice La 
Forest’s view that a “reasonableness” test of the kind seen in Irwin Toy17 
should be imported into the section 1 Charter analysis, such that the 
legislature would be afforded “reasonable leeway” when engaged in the 
kind of line drawing at play in this instance.18  
On October 4, 1989 we met to discuss the case. She explained to me 
that she had been reflecting for some time about there being at least two 
possible approaches to Charter interpretation: one that looked at a value 
in a general way and then turned to the case; and a second that would 
look more carefully at the context in which the value was engaged before 
elaborating on the nature of that value. Her concern was that the rights 
and freedoms set out in the Charter were broad concepts. She wanted to 
                                                                                                             
17 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Québec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 
(S.C.C.). 
18 Edmonton Journal, supra, note 13, at 1380-81. 
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see whether it was possible to generate greater precision with respect to 
that aspect of a given right or freedom that was actually at play in a 
given case before embarking on an analysis of the significance of that 
right or freedom. She felt that this was important because it might then 
enable one to engage in a more finely calibrated weighing of the values 
or interests at play. Hers was a search for a method of Charter analysis 
that would result in greater precision and clarity regarding the reasons 
why, and the ways in which, values were engaged in any given case. 
We then began to review the reasons that were circulating. Justice 
Wilson told me that she felt Justice Cory had used the first approach. As 
a result, one was provided with a lengthy discussion of the importance of 
freedom of the press that was rather abstract and that centred on a 
dimension of the Charter value (freedom of the press) that many might 
feel was not seriously affected by the legislation that was being 
challenged. In turn, Justice La Forest had embraced Justice Cory’s 
abstract analysis of freedom of expression before turning to his own 
general discussion of the right to privacy, once again dealing with the 
concepts of autonomy and privacy interests at a level that was not firmly 
grounded in the context of the case. 
Our discussion turned to the dimensions of the values engaged in 
this instance. We considered aspects of the privacy concern that the 
legislation was not intended to deal with: this was not a case about the 
invasion of a person’s home or physical body or the dissemination of 
personal information without that person’s consent. Rather, the concern 
we identified was one relating to the potential embarrassment that the 
person might feel if details of evidence were published. There was also a 
concern that third parties, such as children, might be hurt if certain 
evidence were published.  
We then examined the values that the legislation might be thought to 
infringe. We discussed the desire that litigants themselves might have to 
see details on evidence published so that their story was made public, as 
well as the importance of being heard in an open setting accessible to the 
community. We considered the evidentiary process and arguments that 
writers such as Bentham and Wigmore had put forward to the effect that 
evidence was more likely to be truthful if the courtroom is open and 
susceptible to public scrutiny. Finally, we looked at the value of the 
public knowing about the details of evidence in given cases. 
After the meeting, I made a point of summarizing our discussion so 
that we would have something in writing that captured the principal 
points we had covered and that we could use as we moved forward. The 
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task was now to turn all of this into a draft judgment. I hasten to add that 
at no point in our discussions had Justice Wilson allowed whatever 
views she might have had on what the outcome of the case should be to 
distract us from the task at hand. This was not the last time that I would 
be struck by her preoccupation with ensuring that what she believed to 
be the right approach or method of analysis was well articulated and 
clearly laid out before she turned her mind to the results that an 
application of that approach might yield. 
With our conversation fresh in my mind, I prepared a first draft. 
Justice Wilson then took that draft and proceeded to rewrite it 
extensively. This was an iterative process: she used the draft as a way to 
decide what she did or did not want to say and to refine the concepts that 
had first been laid out while we had discussed the matter. The end 
product did not look much like what I had first written. At the time I no 
doubt thought that I had missed the mark and failed to understand what 
she was after. But as the year unfolded I would develop a much better 
appreciation of her approach to decision writing, coming to understand 
that I was there to prepare a draft that would get the ball rolling and that 
she would then use this as a way to test her own ideas — rolling up her 
sleeves and writing extensively as she reflected on what she liked or did 
not like about her clerk’s efforts to articulate her thoughts. Sometimes 
her clerks did a good job of capturing where her reasoning was taking 
her and sometimes they did not. But this was not solely a function of her 
law clerks’ skills; indeed, it was often a function of how well developed 
her own thoughts were. Very often, we were witness to and participated 
in her struggles to give structure and content to thoughts that had been 
bubbling away for some time but still lacked clear definition. Draft after 
draft of a judgment would serve to clarify matters slowly but surely. 
She worked very hard on the opening section of the decision entitled 
“Methodology of Charter Application” — a section that had been 
entirely absent from the draft that I had prepared. As she wrote, her ideas 
came into greater focus. She characterized Justice Cory’s approach as an 
abstract approach that determined the values in play at large. She felt 
that he had not adequately captured the fact that the values at stake in 
this case were the right of litigants to the protection of their privacy in 
matrimonial disputes and the right of the public to an open process.  
Justice Wilson reached back to an earlier case that she thought had 
failed to balance particularized values — that is values identified in 
context — at times weighing two generalized values or a generalized 
value against a particularized value. In her mind, the challenge was to 
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ensure that all values or interests at stake in a case had been properly 
particularized. More particularly, she spoke of Re Public Service 
Employee Relations Act (Alta.),19 where she felt that unlike the majority 
judgment Chief Justice Dickson’s dissent had made use of a combined 
purposive and contextual approach to the issues in that case, asking 
himself what the purpose of freedom of association was in the context of 
labour relations. I realized now that her preoccupation with the 
methodological issue she was wrestling with dated back some time (in 
fact, it can be traced back to at least 1985)20 and that the Chief Justice’s 
analytic approach in that case had resonated with her. Indeed, in our 
conversations she had come back to this case repeatedly as something of 
a touchstone for her thoughts on the methodological issues she was now 
so keen to speak to. Building on her review of what had gone on in that 
case — a majority had in her view followed an abstract approach, while 
the Chief Justice had used a contextual approach — she went on to say 
that “[t]he contextual approach attempts to bring into sharp relief the 
aspect of the right or freedom which is truly at stake in the case as well 
as the relevant aspects of any values in competition with it”.21 
Her judgment then sought to apply the method that she had just laid 
out. She first discussed the importance of an open court process, drawing 
now more extensively on material that I had set out in the draft I had 
prepared — yet constantly refining and reworking sentences so that they 
came to reflect her style of writing and accurately expressed her ideas. 
She laid out a series of reasons why an open court process was 
important, noting that “not only is an open trial more likely to be a fair 
trial but it is also seen to be a fair trial and thereby contributes in a 
meaningful way to public confidence in the operation of the courts”.22 
She concluded that the public interest in open trials and in the ability of 
the press to provide complete reports of what takes place in the 
courtroom is rooted in “the need 1) to maintain an effective evidentiary 
process; (2) to ensure a judiciary and juries that behave fairly and that 
are sensitive to the values espoused by the society; (3) to promote a 
shared sense that our courts operate with integrity and dispense justice; 
and (4) to provide an ongoing opportunity for the community to learn 
how the justice system operates and how the law being applied daily in 
                                                                                                             
19 [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.). 
20 See Bertha Wilson’s reference to, and discussion of, the “contextual approach” in her 
1985 speech “Decision Making in the Supreme Court” (1986) 36 U.T.L.J. 227, at 245. 
21 Edmonton Journal, supra, note 13, at 1355-56. 
22 Id., at 1360. 
308 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
the courts affects them”.23 She also noted that the litigants themselves 
might have an interest in a public airing of the injustices that they feel 
they have suffered alone and without any support in the community.24 
These were points that we had discussed, but she had now categorized 
and organized them in the way that she thought made the most sense. 
The arguments in favour of an open court process were therefore 
strong. The question was what might justify putting restrictions in place. 
She agreed with Justice La Forest that concerns about privacy were at 
play, but it was “important to identify what aspect of the broad concept 
of privacy is actually engaged by the impugned legislation”.25 In this 
instance, she was of the view that the legislation in question was an 
effort to “afford some protection against the embarrassment or grief or 
loss of face that may flow from the publication of the particulars of one’s 
intimate private life disclosed in the courtroom”.26 But not everyone 
would be of interest to the press and in many instances matrimonial 
cases, although difficult for the parties concerned, would not necessarily 
attract much public attention. Ultimately, she was of the view that while 
“matrimonial litigation may well involve allegations of cruel, immoral 
and aberrant behaviour which may, as La Forest J. points out, adversely 
impact on the children of the marriage, I think that legislation seeking to 
address that concern should do so specifically or through the grant of 
judicial discretion and should be strictly confined to that narrow range of 
cases”.27 
With the values now more clearly defined or “particularized”, 
Justice Wilson set out to weigh these competing interests. She agreed 
with Justice Cory that while the protection of privacy was a legitimate 
objective and the impugned legislation was rationally connected to this 
objective, the legislation lacked the required degree of proportionality. 
Only a relatively limited percentage of matrimonial cases could be 
expected to involve evidence whose publication would cause severe 
emotional and psychological trauma and public humiliation for the 
parties and/or their children. While such cases might well justify bans on 
publications, the problem in this instance was that the legislation went 
further than that — sweeping in cases where no such concerns were at 
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stake. As a result, she concluded that the legislative provision at issue 
could not be justified under section 1 of the Charter. 
It is worth noting that Justice Wilson had chosen not to pick up a 
theme that I had first developed in my September memo to her, and 
again worked into several pages of the draft judgment that I had served 
up, concerning the way in which Justice La Forest had emphasized the 
need for the legislature to have reasonable leeway when line drawing. 
What was and remains striking to me about this aspect of her judgment 
was that she was at all times focused on the application of the 
methodology that she had developed and the need for careful balancing. 
She was not interested in getting into a debate with Justice La Forest 
about whether to inject an added layer of deference into section 1 
analysis, choosing instead to apply the Oakes test28 as initially conceived 
and to focus on the balancing exercise her approach had led her to. Often 
overlooked, it seems to me, was her commitment to respect foundational 
principles of Charter interpretation that the Court had recently put in 
place. She regularly eschewed others’ efforts to revisit or qualify these 
foundational Charter decisions. 
The month of November saw us exchanging memos and holding 
further discussions about her draft judgment. In the process, I did an 
exhaustive review of literature on the Charter to see if anyone had 
previously developed the concept of a contextual approach to Charter 
analysis. In a memo in early November, I noted that while the terms 
“context” and “contextual approach” had been used by others, the 
terminology had not been used in a consistent fashion and different 
authors had meant different things when they used the term. I ventured 
that she might want to consider making the methodological point that 
she wished to put forward without using the term “the contextual 
approach”, lest it lead people to confuse the points she wished to make 
with what others had had to say when using the term. I heard nothing 
back on this and knew better than to push the point! In retrospect, 
however, I must confess that I have often wondered if the method she 
was elaborating would not have been more readily understood and 
consistently applied by others if the term “contextual approach” had not 
been used. 
By mid-November we were refining the judgment and weaving in 
some final points. In response to concerns that she had about particular 
aspects of the draft, we reworked specific paragraphs. I provided her 
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with a detailed memorandum raising questions about various points in 
the draft and she considered these observations, adjusting the judgment 
where she felt it appropriate to do so. One last memo went in on some 
minor points at the end of November. References and citations were 
double checked. The decision was then ready to go and promptly 
circulated to her colleagues. 
The time that it had taken to work through the methodological points 
that Justice Wilson wished to make had resulted in others on the Court 
gravitating towards the reasons that Justice Cory and Justice La Forest 
had already circulated. Ultimately, the position that Justice Cory had put 
forward would garner support from the Chief Justice and Justice Lamer. 
Justice Wilson’s reasons had come late in the piece. But she knew that 
she was writing with an eye to making what she felt was an important 
methodological point and was determined to work through that point 
carefully, regardless of any strategic considerations. Indeed, I do not 
recall her ever approaching the business of judging with an eye to trying 
to win a majority or persuade a given judge to support her. She simply 
focused on what she felt was the right approach and was quite prepared 
— indeed felt obliged — to write separate reasons when necessary in 
order to ensure that what she felt was the right method for tackling a 
problem was on the record. 
2. Freedom of Expression — Round 2: The Prostitution Trilogy 
The lessons that I had learned while working on Edmonton Journal 
were simultaneously being reinforced in a series of cases sometimes 
known as the Prostitution Trilogy:29 three cases that also provide a 
fascinating window into the way in which Justice Wilson approached 
difficult cases and the way in which she would consider arguments 
carefully, yet avoid going down paths that seemed to her to push the 
envelope further than was appropriate given the constitutional role that 
the Court was called upon to play. The issue at the heart of these cases 
was whether a section of the Criminal Code30 (section 195.1(1)(c)) 
which prohibited communicating in public for the purpose of prostitution 
and another section (section 193) which prohibited the keeping of a 
common bawdy-house infringed section 2(b) and section 7 of the 
Charter.  
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Oral arguments were heard in December, 1988. Upon my arrival in 
September 1989, and as had been the case with Edmonton Journal, I 
discovered both that I was walking into a process that had been 
unfolding for some time and, more intriguingly, that Justice Wilson’s 
thoughts on the matter were still a work in progress. Justice Wilson’s 
approach was interesting: she did not sit me down and say here is what I 
have decided about one aspect of the case, but here is where I am still 
trying to make up my mind, so help me with the following issue. Rather, 
she was still considering multiple points of view and evaluating different 
ways in which one might come at the very difficult issues in play. Nor 
did she ask me to run off and provide her with a memo giving her my 
thoughts on the “right answer” to the case. She asked me instead to give 
her my thoughts on how best to shape a method of analysis for dealing 
with cases in which it was argued that there had been a breach both of 
the right to freedom of expression found in section 2(b) of the Charter 
and of the right found in section 7 of the Charter not to be deprived of 
liberty except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. 
This was not the last time that I would discover that Justice Wilson had 
already been thinking for many months about an issue and that her 
asking me to produce a memo was really just a step in forcing herself to 
crystallize her thoughts on the matter. What I realized only in retrospect 
was that Justice Wilson saw this case as one that involved important 
issues of principle concerning the interaction between the concept of 
fundamental justice in section 7 and other Charter rights that might come 
into play in a case. But in September 1989, she was still reflecting on 
how best to approach this question. 
Though it was not immediately obvious to me, Justice Wilson was 
also making use of one of her law clerks in a way that was of a piece 
with the approach that she would take time and time again throughout 
the year. She would ask us to develop positions that she would then 
weigh and assess, feeding the outcome of that analysis into a process of 
thinking that had already been underway for some time — always with 
an eye to seeing whether the position was one that might have merit and, 
just as importantly, whether it was one that it would be appropriate for 
her to embrace given the nature of the institution of which she was a 
part. Often she would leave our carefully considered analysis to one side. 
While it was no doubt disappointing at first to realize that one’s efforts 
had not met with resounding approval, with time I came to see that the 
efforts were not without importance: Justice Wilson was a strong 
believer in the need to test positions, ensuring they had had a full 
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hearing. If she did not embrace a position, the exercise of having 
considered it fully would help her develop increased comfort with the 
alternate route that she was taking. For better or worse, we are generally 
unaware of the paths that judges consider but decide not to go down. Yet 
it has often seemed to me that these decisions — so rarely recorded — 
can shed much light on a judge’s conception of her role and 
responsibilities.  
Justice Lamer circulated his draft reasons first. They were lengthy, 
running some 74 pages. He was determined to make clear that in his 
view section 7 was there to protect liberty and security of the person in 
the sense that the criminal law had sought to protect these principles 
through the years and that there was no room for section 7 to protect so-
called economic rights. This was certainly consistent with the vision of 
negative liberty that I had suggested Justice Lamer subscribed to in the 
article that I had written in 1987. Interestingly, Justice Lamer referred to 
the very passage from R. v. Jones31 in which Justice Wilson had cited 
John Stuart Mill. In a rather surprising twist, he then went on to suggest 
that a perspective of the kind Justice Wilson had set out in R. v. Jones 
was reflective of “several leading American decisions that have dealt 
with the definition of liberty in the context of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution”32 and that were prepared 
to embrace a conception of economic liberty. He contrasted this with 
Canadian jurisprudence, which he suggested had decided that liberty 
“does not generally extend to commercial or economic interests”.33 He 
then went on to state that if “liberty or security of the person under s. 7 
of the Charter were defined in terms of attributes such as dignity, self-
worth and emotional well-being, it seems that liberty under s. 7 would be 
all inclusive”.34 Moreover, he asserted that: 
This Court has until now, save for certain comments of my colleague 
Wilson J., taken an exclusionary approach to defining liberty and 
security of the person. While it is not essential to the disposition of this 
ground of appeal, I feel, having regard to some of the pronouncements 
of Courts of Appeal on the subject, that I should to some extent 
                                                                                                             
31 Supra, note 8. 
32 Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), supra, note 14, at 
1163. 
33 Id., at 1166. 
34 Id., at 1170. 
(2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) WORKING WITH BERTHA WILSON 313 
disclose my views as to the nature of the liberty and security of the 
person s. 7 is protecting.35 
Moving well beyond what was required in order to deal with the 
case at hand, Justice Lamer engaged in something of a pre-emptive 
manoeuvre designed to constrain the direction in which future thinking 
about section 7 would go.  
Justice Lamer went on to point out that the guarantees of life, liberty 
and security of the person “are placed together with a set of provisions 
(ss. 8-14) which are mainly concerned with criminal and penal 
proceedings”.36 It followed, in his view, that “the restrictions on liberty 
and security of the person that s. 7 is concerned with are those that occur 
as a result of an individual’s interaction with the justice system, and its 
administration”.37 That is,  
the confinement of individuals against their will, or the restriction of 
control over their own minds and bodies, are precisely the kinds of 
activities that fall within the domain of the judiciary as guardian of the 
justice system. By contrast, once we move beyond the “judicial 
domain”, we are into the realm of general public policy where the 
principles of fundamental justice, as they have been developed 
primarily through the common law, are significantly irrelevant.38  
He concluded:  
Put shortly, I am of the view that s. 7 is implicated when the State, by 
resorting to the justice system, restricts an individual’s physical liberty 
in any circumstances. Section 7 is also implicated when the state 
restricts individuals’ security of the person by interfering with, or 
removing from them, control over their physical and mental integrity.39  
Not surprisingly, he was of the view that the rights under section 7 
did not extend to the right to exercise one’s chosen profession. 
Justice Lamer finished up his reasons by concluding that while 
section 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code violated section 2(b)’s 
protection of freedom of expression, it was a justifiable and 
proportionate restriction under section 1. He noted: 
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One of the primary objectives of s. 195.1(1)(c) is to curb the nuisances 
caused by the public or “street” solicitation of prostitutes and their 
customers. These nuisances include impediments to pedestrian and 
vehicular traffic, as well as the general confusion and congestion that is 
accompanied by an increase in related criminal activity such as 
possession and trafficking of drugs, violence and pimping. The 
nuisance aspect of the law, as it relates to traffic problems, is not, 
however, its only objective.40  
He was of the view that  
the legislative objectives of the section go beyond merely preventing 
the nuisance of traffic congestion and general street disorder. There is 
the additional objective of minimizing the public exposure of an 
activity that is degrading to women with the hope that potential 
entrants in the trade can be deflected at an early stage and of restricting 
the blight that is associated with public solicitation for the purposes of 
prostitution.41 
He concluded that the section impaired freedom of expression as 
little as reasonably possible in order to achieve the legislative objective. 
Justice Wilson digested Justice Lamer’s draft reasons. She was not 
satisfied with them. But as I had seen in Edmonton Journal and 
continued to learn through the year, this did not mean that she was 
necessarily going to disagree with the conclusion. She was a great 
believer in the importance of developing an analytical approach that she 
felt had merit and only then seeing where it took her with respect to the 
conclusion. 
My colleague Audrey Macklin and I, on the other hand, were quite 
troubled with the notion that Parliament had criminalized 
communication with respect to an activity — the performance of sexual 
acts in exchange for payment — that Parliament had not criminalized. It 
certainly seemed to me at the time that it was passing strange that 
Parliament was in effect saying that we will let people make money in 
this way, but we will send them to jail for engaging in communication 
designed to enable them to get clients. All the more so since those being 
sent to jail were so often the victims of pimps and clients — and in many 
respects were therefore least deserving of being penalized. 
This led to more than one lively and protracted discussion with 
Justice Wilson in her chambers — a sign that the case was a difficult 
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one. She knew the value of time and was disciplined in the way in which 
she interacted with her law clerks — most often preferring to deal with 
us in writing or through very short meetings. But this time Audrey and I 
found ourselves in long meetings with her as we wrestled with the issues 
at stake.  
I can recall that during at least one of these meetings we looked long 
and hard at the proposition that section 7 must protect some aspect of a 
right to earn a living. Indeed, I recall clearly a strong sense of frustration 
at the time that Justice Wilson was not able to see her way to exploring 
whether section 7 might embody some such right. In retrospect, I was 
clearly influenced by the article I had written on liberty in 1987 and 
somewhat astonished at Justice Lamer’s unabashed efforts to shut down 
any room to explore a more robust vision of liberty than the one he felt 
was at the heart of section 7. But Justice Wilson was not about to take 
the bait in order to engage in a sweeping debate of the conception of 
liberty at play in section 7.  
I was greatly puzzled with this at the time. I for one had taken the 
bait and my lively discussions with Justice Wilson were fuelled by my 
perspective on the need to resist his efforts to close the door on a more 
textured vision of liberty. But it gradually became apparent that she felt 
it inappropriate to engage in sweeping pronouncements about section 7 
of the kind Justice Lamer had just formulated. In her view, a judge’s role 
was to look at the way in which a Charter right was engaged in a given 
case (just as she had done in Edmonton Journal). On more than one 
occasion during these discussions, she observed to us that however much 
she might think our views had merit, she simply did not feel that her role 
as a judge allowed her to go beyond what the case at hand called for. 
Notwithstanding our repeated efforts to put the highest and best case 
to her for opening up the door to approaching her decision through the 
prism of a more robust conception of liberty than the one that Justice 
Lamer was positing, Justice Wilson made it clear that she was not 
prepared to go down that path in this case — no matter how well 
intentioned we might be. She was acutely conscious that Charter rights 
were anchored in our legal history and that great care had to be taken 
before pushing their content beyond boundaries that had been carefully 
worked out through decades, if not centuries. 
That said, she saw no point in closing doors unless one had to. 
Moreover, she had wrestled for some time with the right way to come at 
the case and concluded that it made much more sense to start with an 
analysis of freedom of expression since the case involved a provision 
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that restricted communication, rather than head out of the gates as 
Justice Lamer had with an analysis of section 7. I was starting to see why 
she had been so preoccupied with the issue of how best to approach a 
case that engaged section 2(b) and section 7. Rather than embrace Justice 
Lamer’s determined effort to limit section 7, she decided that the case 
really did not require one to deal with the question whether section 7 
protected an economic right. This was because in her view the provision 
obviously engaged section 2(b)’s protection of freedom of expression.  
She began her analysis with section 2(b) and noted that “this is a 
case where the government’s purpose is to restrict the content of 
expression by singling out meanings that are not to be conveyed in the 
hope that this will deal with the physical consequences emanating from 
expressive activity that carries the prohibited meaning”.42 But, in her 
view, “[w]here the state is concerned about the harmful consequences 
that flow from communicative activity with an economic purpose and 
where, rather than address those consequences directly, the content of 
communicative activity is proscribed, then the provision must, in my 
view, be justified as a reasonable limit under s. 1 of the Charter if it is to 
be upheld”.43 
The challenge though was to identify the legislative objective. Here 
she felt uncertain about whether Justice Lamer had accurately captured 
the legislative objective. Once again, this conclusion came only after 
exhaustive analysis. At her request, November and December 1989 saw 
me write several memos in which I set out summaries of the submissions 
that the parties had made on the objective that the impugned legislation 
was seeking to address, as well as broader analysis of the legislation’s 
objectives. Justice Wilson was slowly but surely trying to bring into 
focus the purpose of the legislation so that she could more effectively 
determine whether the legislation would withstand section 1 analysis. 
Her judgment includes a detailed exposé of the different submissions 
made to the Court with respect to the legislative objective, which she 
grouped into categories ranging from the narrowest (nuisance in the 
streets) to a middle ground (social nuisance) to the widest (prostitution-
related activities). She suggested that Justice Lamer had embraced the 
widest. But she noted that all of the parties and intervenors but one 
(Ontario’s Attorney General) who had made submissions had in fact 
suggested that the objective was not to deal with prostitution per se, it 
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was to deal with the public or social nuisance. In her view, it was this — 
“the social nuisance arising from the public display of the sale of sex”44 
— that was the fundamental concern that section 195(1)(c) of the 
Criminal Code was addressing.  
She turned to section 1 of the Charter and concluded that given this 
more narrow objective, the measures adopted were not proportional to 
the objective sought to be achieved. The criminalization of communi-
cation regardless of whether it was taking place in areas where there was 
reason to believe it would cause a nuisance was not acceptable: “[i]t is 
not reasonable, in my view, to prohibit all expressive activity conveying 
a certain meaning that takes place in public simply because in some 
circumstances and in some areas that activity may give rise to a public or 
social nuisance”.45 
With section 2(b) and section 1 of the Charter behind us, we still had 
to deal with section 7 and Justice Lamer’s efforts to circumscribe its 
scope. It was now January 1990 as we dug deeper into this question and 
as Justice Wilson’s views were now beginning to gel. My instructions 
were to provide a draft of the section 7 analysis that she would then 
work on that developed the proposition that if a statutory provision 
violates a Charter right, it cannot then be said to accord with the 
principles of fundamental justice in section 7. This was a subtle but 
compelling argument that spoke to the way in which one had to think of 
the interaction between different sections of our Charter.  
This approach also had very little to do with issues relating to the 
extent to which section 7 embraced a positive vision of liberty. Indeed, 
Justice Wilson was quick to make clear she was not rising to the bait. 
She stated that “[m]y colleague Lamer J. approaches the s. 7 issue in this 
appeal as raising a question of ‘economic’ liberty. With the greatest of 
respect, I believe it is neither appropriate nor necessary in order to 
trigger the application of s. 7 to characterize the impugned legislation in 
this way.”46 She noted that conviction under the section in question 
might result in the deprivation of the liberty of the person in question. As 
a result, the legislation had to accord with the principles of fundamental 
justice.  
Here is where Justice Wilson’s judgment broke new ground, for she 
asserted that one had to take a purposive approach to interpreting the 
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principles of fundamental justice — something that Justice Lamer had 
himself asserted in the Motor Vehicle Reference.47 And in her view the 
principles set out in other sections of the Charter were clearly now part 
of the basic tenets of our legal system. Indeed, they were part of the 
supreme law of the land. It followed “that a law that infringes the right to 
liberty under s. 7 in a way that also infringes another constitutional right 
(which infringement is not saved by s. 1) cannot be said to accord with 
the principles of fundamental justice”48 and would therefore have to be 
justified under section 1 of the Charter.  
She noted that section 1 analysis was required once more as a 
provision that violated one section of the Charter might be justified 
under section 1, but if the provision violated another section of the 
Charter that violation might not be justified. But once again she 
concluded that it was not reasonable and justifiable to deprive citizens of 
their liberty through imprisonment in order to deal with the nuisance 
caused by street solicitation. 
After four difficult months of work, at long last Justice Wilson 
circulated her judgment. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé then signed on to 
Justice Wilson’s judgment. But the rest of the Court was not prepared to 
adopt either Justice Lamer or Justice Wilson’s reasons in their entirety. 
The Chief Justice decided to develop his own set of reasons upholding 
the legislation. By mid-April, 1990 these were circulated. While he 
found Justice Wilson’s characterization of the purpose of the legislation 
compelling and agreed with her that it violated section 2(b), he found 
that the legislation was saved under section 1. In his view, the 
communication that the legislation was out to sanction had an economic 
purpose and communication regarding an economic transaction of sex 
for money did not lie at, or even near, the core of the guarantee of 
freedom of expression. He found that the obtrusiveness linked to the 
enforcement of the provision, when weighed against the resulting 
decrease in the social nuisance associated with street solicitation, could 
be justified under section 1 of the Charter. 
With respect to section 7 of the Charter, Chief Justice Dickson 
agreed there was a clear infringement of liberty. As with Justice Wilson, 
he found it unnecessary to address the question whether section 7 was 
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also violated in an “economic” way. In his view, the case did “not 
provide the appropriate forum for deciding whether ‘liberty’ or ‘security 
of the person’ could ever apply to any interest with an economic, 
commercial or property component”.49  
With respect to the principles of fundamental justice, he concluded 
that the legislation was not so unfair as to violate the principles of 
fundamental justice. In his view, the “fact that the sale of sex for money 
is not a criminal act under Canadian law does not mean that Parliament 
must refrain from using the criminal law to express society’s 
disapprobation of street solicitation”.50 Since the principles of 
fundamental justice were not breached, there was no need to deal with 
section 1 of the Charter. Justices La Forest and Sopinka were quick to 
sign on to the Chief Justice’s reasons. 
What to make of the outcome? While I might have been 
disappointed at the outset that the case was not going to be a vehicle for 
exploring whether the concept of liberty in section 7 of the Charter was 
more expansive than the classical view, I came to understand that Justice 
Wilson — and in turn Chief Justice Dickson — were acutely aware that 
a case focused on the sale of sex was not the right setting in which to 
discuss this issue. They had made clear that they were not prepared to 
endorse Justice Lamer’s narrow vision of section 7 since this case did 
not call for such a decision. But I had learned that Justice Wilson was 
acutely sensitive to her constitutional responsibilities and was not about 
to make determinations concerning whether a Charter section protected 
certain rights unless and until the case before the Court clearly called for 
such a determination.  
I would come to work with Justice Wilson on other difficult cases, 
but the Prostitution Trilogy has long seemed to me to illustrate the 
enormous effort that she put into careful thought about fundamental 
issues concerning Charter interpretation. She realized that the 
methodological issues at play would shape Charter analysis for years to 
come and she had shown the same determination that I had witnessed in 
Edmonton Journal to ensure that she spelled out the approach that she 
thought most made sense. She had also made full use of her clerks, 
ensuring that they served as regular sounding board for her evolving 
thinking on the right way to approach the issues in question and the 
implications of that approach once applied to the cases at hand. She had 
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also shown that it was she who was carrying the heavy burden of 
ensuring that she discharged her constitutional role in a manner that 
respected the constraints within which the judiciary must operate if it is 
to preserve its legitimacy.  
3. Freedom of Expression — Round 3: Taylor, Andrews and 
Keegstra 
Another series of cases that came before the court that year and that 
proved enormously challenging were ones involving what is sometimes 
described as “hate speech”. Once again, Justice Wilson made full use of 
her clerks: as the volume of material filed with the Court was enormous, 
Audrey Macklin and I had little choice but to divide the work in 
preparing memoranda summarizing and analyzing the arguments in issue 
(known as “bench memos”). Our bench memos went in at the very end 
of November 1989 and the cases were heard in December 1989.  
The Taylor51 case raised the question of the constitutionality of 
section 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act,52 which stated that it is 
a “discriminatory practice to communicate telephonically … repeatedly 
… any matter that is likely to expose a person or persons to hatred or 
contempt by reason of the fact that that person or those persons are 
identifiable on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination”. A 
human rights tribunal had found that Mr. Taylor and the Western Guard 
Party had engaged in discriminatory practices of the kind envisaged in 
section 13(1) and had issued a cease and desist order. The appellants 
continued to place messages similar to the ones they had placed over the 
previous two years to the effect, among other things, that Jews founded 
communism and that this conspiratorial movement was responsible for a 
wide array of evils in Canada. The Federal Court found the parties in 
question in contempt and the Federal Court of Appeal had found that 
section 13(1) of the Act was constitutional. 
The Keegstra53 case involved the question whether a section of the 
Criminal Code (section 319(2)) that prohibited the wilful promotion of 
hatred against identifiable groups was unconstitutional. The case was 
especially challenging as it also involved a section of the Criminal Code 
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(section 319(3)(a)) which afforded a defence of “truth” but required the 
accused to prove the truth of the statements in issue on a balance of 
probabilities. An Alberta high-school teacher had made anti-Semitic 
remarks to his students and was charged under the provision. He 
challenged the constitutionality of the section under which he had been 
convicted and the Alberta Court of Appeal found that section 319(2) 
violated section 2(b) of the Charter. It also found that the provision could 
not be saved under section 1 of the Charter. Similar charges had been 
laid in the Andrews54 case against a white supremacist group.  
Justice Wilson proceeded with great care. As I had had occasion to 
see in Edmonton Journal and the Prostitution Trilogy, she had a deep 
commitment to freedom of expression and so did not find the trilogy of 
hate speech cases easy. She repeatedly told us that she was 
uncomfortable with restrictions on people’s ability to communicate ideas 
publicly. Freedom of expression was in her mind a cornerstone of our 
democracy and she thought the Court had to proceed with great care 
before sanctioning restrictions of the kind that the statutory provisions in 
question had put in place. She therefore wanted to see draft reasons from 
Justice McLachlin (who had signalled she would be writing) before 
reaching any conclusions. While Audrey and I had stressed that the 
value of dignity and cultural identity also needed to be put at its highest, 
youthful idealism was once again bumping up against the realities of the 
Court as Bertha Wilson saw them.  
Justice McLachlin circulated her reasons in May 1990 and Justice 
Wilson asked me to review them and to provide her with my thoughts. I 
prepared a lengthy memo analyzing the reasons and suggesting that there 
were a number of methodological issues that needed to be considered. I 
noted that regardless of one’s views of the appropriate disposition of 
these appeals, it was important that there be a finely tuned analysis of the 
nature of the values in conflict with freedom of expression. To my 
surprise, Justice Wilson not only did not rush to write reasons, she made 
it clear that she was still struggling with whether she agreed or disagreed 
with Justice McLachlin’s analysis. In the same way that she had resisted 
being rushed in the Prostitution Trilogy into embracing a vision of 
section 7 that she was concerned might be overly expansive, she was 
cautious about signing on to the idea that one should accept limitations 
on freedom of expression that resulted in criminal sanctions. Ultimately, 
it was the Chief Justice who signalled that he would be writing. Justice 
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322 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
Wilson decided that she would wait to see his reasons before making any 
decisions.  
Chief Justice Dickson found that the section at issue in Keegstra and 
Andrews, as well as the provision of Canadian Human Rights Act at 
issue in Taylor, infringed section 2(b) of the Charter since all non-
violent forms of expression were protected under this provision. 
Nevertheless, in his view the provisions were justifiable under section 1 
because of the substantial and pressing objective of the legislation to 
prevent the harm caused by hate propaganda. 
Justice Wilson decided to endorse the Chief Justice’s reasons. All 
three cases split 4-3 in support of the Chief Justice’s position. Knowing 
her enormous respect for Brian Dickson, I have no doubt that she was far 
more influenced by the fact that the Chief Justice had authored this 
decision than by the memos that Audrey and I had written.  
Justice Wilson never did produce written reasons in these cases. 
Nevertheless, the caution that she exercised in coming to a conclusion is 
revealing and of a piece with the deliberation that had gone into each of 
the other freedom of expression cases with which I had been involved. 
Similarly, her willingness to listen to her clerks, yet unwillingness to 
rush to embrace the perspective they were advocating was also of a piece 
with the approach to judicial decision-making that I had witnessed in the 
Prostitution Trilogy. These cases have also long struck me as important 
because in the rush to focus on decisions where Justice Wilson found 
legislation unconstitutional, it is easy to overlook ones in which she 
upheld the legislature’s decision concerning what the community’s 
values called for in the way of restrictions on behaviour seen as 
unacceptable. 
Hate speech cases continue to provoke intense discussion in Canada. 
Bertha Wilson was acutely aware that these cases were difficult precisely 
because it was not always clear that there was strong social consensus on 
the matters at the heart of the appeals and because the cases involved 
liberty, a value that had led her to conclude that the provisions at issue in 
Edmonton Journal and the Prostitution Trilogy were unconstitutional. 
While some might disagree with the conclusion that she reached, it was 
nevertheless once again the outcome of careful consideration of the 
views that Justice MacLachlin and Chief Justice Dickson had put 
forward in favour of each side of this debate. 
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4. Postscript: McKinney and Sections 15 and 32 of the Charter  
I would be remiss if I did not also offer a few observations on Justice 
Wilson’s reasons in McKinney.55 The case involved a constitutional 
challenge to universities’ policies concerning mandatory retirement and 
was heard with other cases concerning mandatory retirement provisions 
applicable to other professions. The matter not only raised difficult 
equality rights issues under section 15 of the Charter, it provided the 
Court with one of its earliest opportunities to provide detailed thoughts 
on the meaning of the term “government” in section 32 of the Charter. 
While my involvement began in May 1990, the case had been before the 
Court for over a year. 
In May 1989 Audrey Macklin had prepared a very substantial and 
thoughtful bench memo analyzing the issues at play. On May 1, 1990 
Justice La Forest circulated his reasons in the cases to his fellow justices. 
He concluded that universities were not a part of government and 
therefore were not subject to the Charter. As a result, the Charter did not 
apply to the universities’ mandatory retirement policies. Even had the 
Charter applied, it was his view that while the policies violated the 
Charter’s section 15 equality rights, they were justified under section 1. 
Mary Eaton had just begun her term as a law clerk to Justice Wilson and 
had in turn produced a detailed analysis of Justice La Forest’s reasons.  
Justice Wilson decided she had to write. This was no easy task. It 
had, after all, taken Justice La Forest almost a year to produce his 
reasons. With her now familiar determination, she mobilized the troops. 
On August 1, 1990 she sent a memo to Mary and myself in which she 
allocated responsibility for different portions of the analysis required. I 
was called upon to work on aspects of the judgment that dealt with the 
non-applicability of the Charter to private action and with the nature of 
government (sometimes referred to as the public-private distinction — a 
theme that I had touched on in passing in my 1987 article). I provided a 
draft of the section 32 analysis to Justice Wilson on August 20, 1990 — 
one of my final acts as a law clerk as my year with her was drawing to a 
close.  
What struck me once again as I discussed this part of the judgment 
with Justice Wilson was her concern to set out a methodology for 
subsequent Charter analysis, this time for questions involving the need to 
ascertain whether one was dealing with government. We had worked 
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hard reviewing applicable jurisprudence and literature to develop three 
tests designed to assist in identifying whether one was dealing with 
government: (1) whether the legislative, executive or administrative 
branch of government exercised general control over the entity in 
question; (2) whether the entity performed a traditional government 
function or a function which in more modern times is recognized as a 
responsibility of the state; and (3) whether the entity is one that acts 
pursuant to statutory authority specifically granted to it to enable it to 
further an objective that government seeks to promote in the broader 
public interest.  
But not only was Justice Wilson concerned to develop a series of 
practical questions that would assist with Charter analysis, she was also 
out to make a point about the role of government in our society. I had of 
course not got very far in my efforts to advance a conception of positive 
liberty in the context of the Prostitution Trilogy. But I realized in reading 
her draft’s discussion of government that she had decided that this time 
the setting was an appropriate one in which to speak to this issue. She 
rejected the notion that government was purely restrictive of people’s 
freedom. She examined the evolution of government in Canada and 
stressed that it had also played a beneficial role. Most significantly in 
this regard, she stressed that freedom was not co-extensive with the 
absence of government; rather freedom had often required the 
intervention and protection of government. Ultimately, she concluded 
that universities were part of government as they discharged an 
important public function which government had decided to have 
performed.  
Her discussion of section 15 was equally compelling from my 
perspective, as she noted that the purpose of the equality guarantee was 
to promote human dignity — a concept that I had argued in my 1987 
article was central to the Court developing a conception of positive 
liberty. She concluded that the university’s mandatory retirement 
policies could not be justified under section 1 of the Charter. 
Justice Wilson was joined by Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in what 
turned out to be a dissent. Be that as it may, the decision was once again 
the result of an enormous effort on Justice Wilson’s part to plough 
through difficult intellectual terrain in order to provide a method for 
Charter analysis that would assist in the future. Once again, she had 
made full use of her law clerks to help her work through challenging 
issues, allocating different parts of the judgment to different clerks and 
supervising and then meticulously reworking their drafts. This time, 
(2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) WORKING WITH BERTHA WILSON 325 
however, she had felt the context and the issues at play allowed for a 
statement about the role of government in promoting dignity and self-
worth — essential components of a vision of positive liberty. It was a 
nice way to wrap up my year at Court. 
IV. REFLECTIONS ON WILSON’S APPROACH TO DECISION-MAKING 
After both Justice Wilson and Chief Justice Dickson had retired, I 
had the good fortune to spend time with the former Chief Justice on a 
regular basis over the course of several years. Bertha Wilson had 
suggested to him that I might be able to assist with the preparation of 
some of his articles and speeches, as he was looking for someone to play 
that role. The very first speech that I would work with him on was one 
that he gave shortly after his retirement in 1991 at a symposium in 
honour of Bertha Wilson — a piece on which we collaborated 
particularly closely and into which he poured a great deal of energy and 
attention.56 With the benefit of hindsight, I can now more readily point to 
some of my own experiences with Bertha Wilson as evidencing parts of 
the thesis set out in Brian Dickson’s article. 
Dickson began by noting that Bertha Wilson was aware that judges 
are not completely independent from other actors in society. There is a 
degree of mutual dependence that sustains the legitimacy of the judiciary 
and affects the way it goes about its business. He pointed to a speech that 
Bertha Wilson had given in 1983,57 in which she had observed that 
conflicts may arise between a judge’s moral framework and the hard 
reality that judges do not operate in a vacuum. Judges obviously have 
consciences and are subject to a range of moral considerations. But she 
had stressed that judges are unelected and that the ongoing legitimacy of 
their decisions depends to a considerable extent on these decisions being 
widely accepted. The legitimacy of the judiciary therefore turns in no 
small measure on its accepting that some decisions are properly arrived 
at in a forum other than a court, a forum whose members are directly 
accountable to the public.  
Brian Dickson went on to say that while Bertha Wilson was always 
profoundly attuned to what her moral framework demanded of her and 
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57 Bertha Wilson, “Guaranteed Freedoms in a Democratic Society — A New Role for the 
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sought to develop the law in a principled matter, she was at all times 
operating with a refined sense of the realities of the context in which a 
judge operates. He noted: 
Some have at times complained about the direction in which she 
sought to take the law, suggesting that her work illustrates the dangers 
of unrestrained judicial activism. But in my view, in their rush to label 
her a judicial activist, these critics quite simply ignored that she was in 
fact profoundly sensitive both to the limits of the law and to the 
constraints that these limits placed on the way in which she could 
shape the law.58 
Certainly this had been my experience working with her on the 
Prostitution Trilogy. She had understood that the very real constraints 
that she was working within meant that there were certain lines of 
reasoning that it was not appropriate to embark on. Hence her 
unwillingness in that case to engage in an analysis of whether the 
Charter protected economic rights.  
Chief Justice Dickson observed that Bertha Wilson had reflected 
carefully about the limits of courts and the extent to which it was 
acceptable to push the law forward within those limits. While it was easy 
to track the way in which she redrew boundaries or incorporated new 
ideas into existing methods of analysis, the less obvious and more 
difficult exercise was to understand why she stopped at any given point 
and why in some instances she chose not to realign particular frontiers. 
This is a passage of the article that has long struck me as particularly 
significant because it points to an aspect of judicial decision-making that 
we often have difficulty discerning: namely, the lines of reasoning that 
judges decide not to follow and the reasons for those decisions. 
Frequently, judges simply do not explain the paths they have decided it 
would be inappropriate to venture down. My objective in this article has 
been, in part, to build on that observation and to show that in several of 
the most important constitutional cases of the 1989-90 term, Justice 
Wilson avoided paths that her clerks were certainly encouraging her to 
travel down because she felt it inappropriate to do so given the 
constitutional constraints within which a judge must operate.59 
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Elizabeth Halka, “Madam Justice Bertha Wilson: A ‘Different Voice’ in the Supreme Court of 
Canada” (1996) 35(1) Alta. L. Rev. 242, at 246 and 247. 
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Brian Dickson went on to stress that Justice Wilson understood that 
a judge could not simply bring his or her own moral intuitions to bear on 
a given problem. There is a deeper challenge: a judge must understand 
the community’s moral fabric and bring an understanding of that 
morality to bear on a given issue. She knew this was no easy task: 
disentangling one’s own views from those of the community with a view 
to better applying the latter was not a simple matter. “Indeed, she felt 
that in many ways the greatest challenge for a judge was to resolve the 
problem of how to integrate contemporary values and notions of justice 
into decision-making without allowing those decisions to become 
completely subjective.”60 I had seen her wrestle with just this challenge 
in the hate speech cases: she had had to grapple with her deep 
commitment to the value of free speech and to develop an equally 
refined understanding of the way in which the value of human dignity 
came into play in understanding why the legislature had enacted the laws 
being challenged.  
Brian Dickson described her as having a “democratic frame of 
reference”.61 He noted that she felt strongly that if the Charter and the 
courts, as interpreters of that document, are to have a meaningful place 
in society, one that is accepted by its citizens as legitimate and worthy of 
respect, then judicial analysis of the Charter’s provisions must reflect 
that community’s most fundamental norms. This was a dynamic 
interpretive exercise, not a static one: that is, one had to be alert to the 
fact that these norms evolve with time as new social problems arise and 
as a society’s understanding of itself evolves. It therefore required that 
judges continually assess the application of the Charter in light of new 
facts, contemporary social theory and the context in which the right was 
called into play (an implicit reference to the decision in Edmonton 
Journal).  
The former Chief Justice concluded that Justice Wilson had struck a 
finely tuned balance that elegantly sidestepped the increasingly sterile 
debate between advocates of judicial restraint and advocates of judicial 
activism. The courts could hardly pretend, with the enactment of the 
Charter, that they did not have a mandate to effect change in the law 
when legislators had given them this very mandate. But this mandate did 
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not mean that the courts could ignore the way in which they fit into our 
democratic system and the limits that their position in that system places, 
both on the kind of change they can realistically hope to effect and on 
the way in which they should seek to bring about that change. Nor could 
courts ignore the ongoing obligation to sustain the link between the 
Charter and our society’s values. In her view the legal standards set out 
in the Charter were expressed in broad and general terms precisely so 
that they might accommodate society’s changing values.62 
I can hardly claim to have a dispassionate perspective with respect to 
Brian Dickson’s observations. But I might perhaps be forgiven for 
observing that they were as true from my vantage point as they were 
from the much more expansive perspective that Brian Dickson brought 
to bear on Justice Wilson’s judicial career. Having worked on cases like 
the Prostitution Trilogy or the hate speech cases, my experience was that 
she did indeed combine great sensitivity to the limits of the judiciary’s 
role with an awareness that when it was appropriate to intervene, it was 
also important to ensure that one was in tune with the community’s 
values and to properly describe and weigh the aspects of those values 
that were engaged in a given case. 
The Prostitution Trilogy had therefore taught me that Justice Wilson 
was acutely sensitive to her constitutional responsibilities.63 She was also 
deeply aware that many of the Charter cases that she was dealing with 
involved methodological issues that would continue to shape Charter 
analysis. Edmonton Journal, the Prostitution Trilogy and McKinney 
were all examples of the extraordinary pressure that she put on herself 
and her law clerks to prepare judgments that set out analytic tools that 
would provide useful guidance for subsequent Charter analysis. Even 
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when she was not writing, she showed great care to ensure that she had 
fully considered competing perspectives. As the hate speech cases 
illustrate, she was at all times engaged in active dialogue with her clerks 
and considered thought about competing perspectives on a case.  
It was no accident, then, that her law clerks during the 1989-90 term 
were kept very busy indeed. Bertha Wilson shouldered a remarkably 
heavy load as a result of her deep commitment to the institution to which 
she had become so integral.64 She expected her law clerks to work 
equally hard to help her carry that load. With those daunting 
expectations came the privilege of bringing new ideas and youthful 
enthusiasm to her chambers and serving as a constant sounding board for 
her thoughts on the right way to approach a given case. While some have 
suggested that she was an activist who systematically overstepped 
boundaries that judges should not cross,65 this is certainly not the judge 
that I saw in action on a day-to-day basis. On the contrary, with each of 
the cases that I have described in this article I came to see even more 
clearly a judge who was deeply concerned to live up to her constitutional 
responsibilities. She knew well that the legitimacy of the Court depended 
not only on the result of the cases that came before it, but every bit as 
much on the approaches that the Court’s members were seen to deploy 
in order to analyze these cases. 
The demands of my professional relationship with Justice Wilson 
wound down as August 1990 came to a close and as I prepared to move 
on. I reflected on how I had been surprised in our first conversation by 
her Scottish brogue and how much I had enjoyed continuing to hear it 
through the year (no doubt it appealed to my own rather more distant 
Scottish roots). I had been a good deal less surprised by her Scottish 
work ethic, though it was one thing to have heard about it and another to 
be subject to it! As I went up to her office on my last day as her law 
clerk to say goodbye, I was about to be surprised again: the formalities 
of the professional relationship now melted away altogether as she gave 
me a big hug, thanking me for my contribution and wishing me well. 
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And so began a new chapter in our relationship: a friendship with Bertha 
and her husband John — who was so integral to Bertha’s success and 
happiness — that saw us speak and meet regularly to discuss her 
experiences as a lawyer, her time as a judge, their shared passion for 
travel and literature, the challenges of serving on the Royal Commission 
on Aboriginal Peoples and political issues that she was now free to 
discuss. I had learned a great deal from Madame Justice Wilson about 
judicial decision-making and the role of a judge in my year with her at 
the Court. To that I was now fortunate to add many more lessons from 
Bertha Wilson about life beyond the law. 
 
 
